RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Application of New Jersey Statute in Pennsylvania
Tort Action-The plaintiff, suing in Pennsylvania, alleged that the defendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, owned a dog which escaped into New Jersey and
there bit the plaintiff. By a New Jersey statute," absolute liability is imposed
upon dog owners for injury caused by dogs in a public place. The defendant
demurred, contending that, for recovery under Pennsylvania law, some act of

negligence should have been alleged. Held, that the demurrer should be overruled, because the plaintiff had stated a good cause of action under New Jersey
law, which was applicable to the case. Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4o
(1937).

By the factual situation of the instant case, the soundness of the result to
be attained by application of the law of the Restatement 2 and of the overwhelming majority of American courts 3 is put to a severe test. While these or
similar facts in hypothetical form have provided a favorite subject for speculation by commentators in the field of conflict of laws, 4 there can be little doubt
that the instant decision is correct under a literal interpretation of existing
American law.5 The fundamental proposition is that the lex loci delicti is the
law governing the creation and extent of liability in tort. 6 The locus delicti, or
place of the wrong, is the "state where the last event necessary to make an
actor liable . . . takes place." 7 If the law of that state imposes an absolute
liability, the defendant is bound by it, although the initial steps in the sequence
of events giving rise to the plaintiff's injury arose in another jurisdiction, in
which absolute liability would not be imposed." While the Pennsylvania precedents were extremely sparse, 9 the instant court, with little hesitation, adopted
I. N. J. Laws 1933, c. 427.

OF LAws (1934) § 377 et seq.
3. See infra note 5.
4. GOODIUCH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927) § 93 (the hypothetical situation is sometimes
complicated by the injured party's death in a third state, ibid.) ; Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457, 466; Lorenzen, Tort Liability and
the Conflict of Laws (193) 47 L. Q. REv. 483, 496.
5. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 (1933) ; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent.
R. R., 78 N. H. 553, 1O3 Aft. 263 (1918); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o
N. E. 198 (i918); Dallas v. Whitney, 188 S. E. 766 (W. Va. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 377-379 (note particularly illustration under § 379, comment f,
which is on all fours with the instant case). In LeForest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 1O9 (1875),
the situation was converse to that of the instant case. In state X, A kept a dog which strayed
into state Y and there bit B. In X, a statute provided for absolute liability, whereas in Y,
the common law rule prevailed. B sued in X. The court applied the law of Y, holding A not
liable.
6. See supra note 4. But cf. Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S. E. 741 (1921).
The English rule requires that the act be wrongful where done, and actionable if it had
been done in England. The "Halley", [i868] L. R. 2 P. C. I93; Machado v. Fontes, [1897]
2 Q. B. 231; see GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 96, n. 32.
2. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT

7. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)

8. Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253 (1933)

§ 377.
(defendant's car was taken to New York where

a statute prevailed to the effect that a lender of a car will be responsible for the injuries
caused with the car), discussed in 2 BEALE, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1935) § 383.1; Dallas v.
Whitney, 188 S. E. 766 (W. Va. 1936) (blast in state A shattered glass in state B; the law
of B, which imposed liability without fault, was applied).
9. In Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, i85 At. 775 (1936), the facts were somewhat similar:
Ohio law was applied in a case where the negligent act originated in Pennsylvania, and injury
occurred in Ohio.
The analogous problem, involving wrongful death statutes, has arisen in Pennsylvania
decisions which are difficult to reconcile. Compare Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. R., 244 Pa.
(429)
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the foregoing statement of the law. The opinion, however, does not discuss
the striking dilemma into which one is cast when he attempts to arrive at a just
and practical solution of the facts of the instant case. 10 To apply the New
Jersey statute is to impose a hardship on a defendant whose conduct has been
blameless when measured by the standards under which he assumed he was
governed. On the other hand, to apply the Pennsylvania law is to deprive the
plaintiff of a remedy to which he was entitled by New Jersey law. Does the
solution, in the last analysis, depend upon whether tort law has as its fundamental object the compensation of the injured, or whether that object is the
regulation of conduct and the punishment of those who inflict injury?"' This
would seem a mere rewording, and not a solution, of the problem. It would
seem that the solution must be a pragmatic one. From that standpoint, the
result of the instant case has the advantage of fostering a uniform working rule,
in that it applies to a somewhat novel situation principles held by a vast majority
of jurisdictions to be applicable to tort problems in general in the field of conflict of laws. This would
seem preferable to the creation of a new rule as each
2
new situation arises.1

Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Validity of Statute Authorizing Appeal by State in Criminal Cases-The defendant was convicted
of murder in the second degree. The State of Connecticut appealed, pursuant
to statute,' and the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment and ordered
a new trial. On the second trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree. 2 The defendant appealed, on the ground that the statute authorizing the state to appeal constituted a denial of due process. Held (Justice Butler
dissenting), that the statute was constitutional, because the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a defendant against double
jeopardy in a prosecution by a state.
(1937).

Palko v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149

In federal prosecutions, the Fifth Amendment bars a new trial at the
instance of the Government, 3 although, if the defendant has obtained a reversal
of the original conviction, he may again be tried.4 Furthermore, having thus
"waived" the defense of double jeopardy, the defendant may even be convicted
of a higher offense. 5 Certainly, in this latter case, it would seem more reason255, go Atl. 558 (914),

with Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 218 Pa. 21, 66 Atl. 975

(1907), and Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 158 Pa. 365, 27 Atl.

OO2 (1893).

io. The difficulties are suggested in Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws
(935) 35 COL. L. REv. 202.
ii. These concepts have been referred to in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1926) 2, 34; HOLMES, THE CoMmoN LAW (1881) 90, 94.

12. See Cook, supranote 4, at 488, with which compare, Cavers, A Critique of the Choice
of Law Problem (1933) 47 Hav. L. REv. 173, the conclusions of which are reprinted in
CHEATHAM, DOWLING AND GOODRICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1936)

345 et seq.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6494: "Appeals from the rulings and the decisions of the

superior court or of any criminal court of common pleas, upon all questions of law arising on
the trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with the permission of the presiding
judge, to the supreme court of errors, in the same manner and to the same effect as if made
by the accused."
2. Aff'd, 122 Conn. 529, igi Atl. 320 (1937).
3. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (904).

4. United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 (1896).
5. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521 (igo5). Accord: State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194,
122 Pac. 995 (1912). Contra: People v. McGinnis, 234 Ill. 68, 84 N. E. 687 (19o8) ; People
v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, lO9 N. W. 44o (19o6) ; Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 7o
Atl. 275 (1908).
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able to say there was no double jeopardy, rather than that an immunity guaranteed by the Constitution was "waived". 6 Moreover, it does not follow that all
the limitations imposed on the Federal Government by the first eight amendments
apply with equal force to the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 It is ordinarily thought that only those "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions" 1 are included in the concept of due process.' If, under the decisions,10 the immunity against double jeopardy as expressed in the Fifth Amendment can be "waived", it would not seem to be the type of prohibition which is
so basic as to fall into this category. The instant statute seeks merely to guarantee a trial free from error, and therefore to give the state, as well as the
defendant, the right to have error corrected by appeal to a higher
tribunal."
2
Such statutes must be approved as aids to a more perfect justice.1

Constitutional Law-Power of School Board to Compel Pupils to
Salute Flag-Complainant and his two children were members of "Jehovah's Witnesses", a religious sect whose tenets forbade any act of obeisance
except toward God. The children were expelled from public school after their
refusal, for religious reasons, to comply with the school board's regulation that
all students and teachers salute the flag each day.' On motion to dismiss the
complaint, held, that the regulation was a violation of the due process clause of
the Federal Constitution 2 and of the religious freedom clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 Gobitis v. Minersville School District, E. D. Pa., Phila.
Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1937, p. I, col. 2.4
6. See Comley, Former Jeopardy (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 674, 681.
7. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (19oo).
8. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926) ; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts,
29, U. S. 97, 105 (1934) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 285 (1936).
q. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99 (1908).
1O. See cases cited supra note 5.
ii. State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 1o3 Atl. 23 (i9i8) ; State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 3o At.
iiio (1894) (upheld instant statute in an appeal by the state from an acquittal). It is interesting to note that neither the constitution of Connecticut nor that of Vermont contains a
"double jeopardy" clause. It is reasonable to contemplate, from the tenor of the above opinions, that both decisions would have been the same, upholding the statutes permitting the state
to appeal, even with "double jeopardy" provisions, on the ground that the retrial of the same
case does not constitute double jeopardy. Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Kepner v. United
States, 195 U. S. 100, 134 (19o4) ; Comley, loc. cit. supra note 6.
12. AnmmcAw LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CamIixAL PRocEnumE (i93o) § 428: "An appeal
may be taken by the State [Commonwealth or People] from: . . . (e) the sentence, on the
ground that it is illegal."
For a collection of statutes conferring upon the state the right to appeal, see commentary
to above section, id. at 1203.
i. The board derived its power from PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 24,
§ 155i, which provides that there shall be taught, inter alia, ". . . civics, including loyalty
to the State and National Government. . . ." See In re Oath of Allegiance, 25 Pa. D. &
C. 8 (1935) (Attorney General's Opinion).
2. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV.
3. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
4. The court, after a long discussion, concluded that it had jurisdiction under 36 STAT.
1091 (I911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1927), which gives the federal court jurisdiction in civil
cases (involving more than $3,ooo) arising under the Federal Constitution. It has generally
been conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against encroachment by a state
on the individual's freedom of religion just as the First Amendment guarantees against encroachment by Congress. See Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S.
245, 262 (1934) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 151 (937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 430.
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In the last two years, regulations requiring the salute have been upheld in
New Jersey, 5 Georgia 6 and Massachusetts. 7 All three of these courts flatly
decided that the salute to the flag was purely a patriotic gesture and could not
possibly have any religious significance.8 To this marked lack of sympathy for
religious minorities, the Georgia court added the statement that ". . . those
who seek the benefits of free education . . . should show their respect for the
flag . . . by saluting the same." 9 Similar assertions have been made in a

Pennsylvania lower court decision, 10 and in a Pennsylvania Attorney General's
Opinion." But the court in the instant case ruled that the individual concerned
is the only fit judge of his own religious conscience, and that no court or school
board may decide whether a particular act has religious significance. Only
when the public safety or health, or the rights of other citizens are prejudiced 12
should the courts interfere." The court further took the stand that free education is not a benefit but an unconditional right which all children have, thus
distinguishing the closely related case of Hamilton v. Regents of University of

California.4 In that case, the complainant was not refused an existing right,
but merely denied the further privilege of attending the state college unless he
attended the course in military training required of all students.' 5 In the instant
case, the children would be deprived of their right to an education, or, in the
alternative, of their right to freedom of conscience. The instant court must be
commended for refusing to give its judicial sanction to such a deprivation.16
(1938). But it should be noted that the Supreme Court recently dismissed an appeal by the
pupil in a case precisely similar to the instant one, for "want of a substantial federal question". Leoles v. Landers, 192 S. E. 218 (Ga. i937), appeal dismissed, 58 Sup. Ct. 364 (937).
5. Hering v. State Board of Education, 177 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1937),
aff'd, i94 Atl. 177 (N. J. 1937).
6. Leoles v. Landers, 192 S. E. 218 (Ga. 1937), appeal dismissed, 58 Sup. Ct. 364 (i937),
cited supra note 4.
7. Nichols v. Mayor of Lynn, 7 N. E. (2d) 577 (Mass. 1937). For a discussion of the
problem in Massachusetts, written while the above case was still being litigated, see Gardner
and Post, The Constitutional Questions Raised by the Flag Salute and Teacher's Oath Acts
in Massachusetts (936) 16 B. U. L. REv. 803.
8. See, e. g., Leoles v. Landers, 192 S. E. 218, 222 (Ga. 1937).
9. Ibid.
1o. Commonwealth v. Kurak, and Commonwealth v. Wilkovitch, Greene County, Pa.,
No. 41 Dec. Sessions (1935), 2 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 2o6 (0936) (criminal prosecution against
parents for permitting children to remain away from school after expulsion).
ii. In re Oath of Allegiance, 22 Pa. D. & C. 8 (1935).
12. Cf. State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. i58, 58 N. W. 728 (894)
(Christian Scientist, performing cures by prayer, held to violate law requiring license to practice medicine) ; WilkesBarre v. Garebed, ii Pa. Super. 355 (1899) (unlawful to beat a drum in a Salvation Army
street-corner revival meeting without a permit) ; Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 Atl.
68 (I91O) (statute forbidding wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools held
valid).
13. As the instant case arose on a motion to dismiss, the court did not rule on whether
the refusal to salute would prejudice the rights of others, but held that this should be argued
as a defense. It is strongly intimated, however, that no rights of others were affected. Instant case at p. 7, col. 2.
14. 293 U. S. 245 (1934), rehearing denied, 293 U. S. 633 (935), 1o IN . L. J. 361, 83 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 529. It was argued in the above case that there was no compulsion to attend a state college. Accord: University of Maryland v. Coale, 165 Md. =4, 167 Atl. 54
(1933), appeal dismissed sub nora., Coale v. Pearson, 290 U. S. 597 (935).
15. Cf. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (1929) ; United States v. Macintosh,
283 U. S. 605 (93r).
In both these cases a person, otherwise fully qualified, was denied
citizenship because of the failure to take an oath relating to the support of the country in case
of war. See Note (1929) 3 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 462.
16. With the division of authority evidenced by the instant case, compare the division on
the question of whether the reading of the King James version of the Bible in the public
schools is an invasion of religious freedom. The cases are collected and discussed in Note
(1930) 28 MIcH. L. REV. 430.
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Constitutional Law-Taxation-Validity of State Sales Tax as to
Goods Shipped in Interstate Commerce-The City of New York placed a
two percent tax on the receipts of every sale in the city.- Plaintiff, an Ohio
corporation, maintained offices in New York City. Plaintiff's salesmen obtained
"special orders" 2 for machines, which orders were sent to Ohio for confirmation. The "special orders" were then packed separately and marked for the
particular customer, but were shipped in carload lots to the salesmen for distribution.3 Held, that the tax as levied on the sales of "special orders" was
unconstitutional, because it constituted a burden on interstate commerce.
National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, N. Y. Ct. of App., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 6,
1937, p. 1999, col. I.
The United States Supreme Court has recently displayed a tendency 4 away
from a strict application of the rule that it is unconstitutional for a state to tax
interstate commerce.-

Thus, in Banker Brothers Co. v. Commonwealth,6 plain-

tiff had a contract with a New York company to solicit orders for automobiles
in Pennsylvania, and to send the orders to New York. If the orders were accepted, the automobiles were sent to the plaintiff for distribution. The Court
concluded, from a complicated factual situation, that the plaintiff was not the
agent of the New York company, and that there were, therefore, two salesone from the company to the plaintiff, and the other from the plaintiff to the
customer. Since the tax was on the latter transaction, it was constitutional.
Although the Banker case may be distinguished from the instant case, in that
here the salesmen were dearly the agents of the Ohio company, still the spirit
of the decision is indicative of the limitations which have been placed on the
traditional immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation. This trend
culminated in the Wiloil case,7 where the Court held that, if it was not essential
i. N. Y. Local Laws 1934, p. 164. The power to exact this tax was conferred on the city
by the state. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 873.
2. 1. e., an order for any machine that deviated in the least from the "standard" machines.
Instant case at col. 1. "Standard" machines were shipped to the office and then sold. The
sales tax was paid on these without protest. It seems fairly well settled that if goods are
shipped from one state to another, and then come to rest before they are sold, a subsequent
sale is taxable. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885) ; American Steel & Wire Co. v.
Speed, 192 U. S. 500 (1903) ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 (1913) ; Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U. S. I (933).
3. The court did not discuss whether there had been a change from interstate to intrastate commerce, when the goods were shipped to the agent in New York for distribution. It
has been held that if the goods are shipped to the agent solely for distribution, it is still interstate commerce. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 (1903) ; Musser v. Grosjean, 7
F. Supp. 1OO (W. D. La. 1934). The instant court cited neither of these cases, relying
solely on one case, not directly analogous. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147
(I918).
4. See Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Federaland State Taxation in
Intergovernmental Relations (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 247, 265. For a discussion of recent cases of the Supreme Court on taxation of interstate commerce, see Lowndes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1, 19; Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 38, 45; Fraenkel,
ConstitutionalIssues in the Supreme Court, x935 Term (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 27, 59.
5. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827). The rule was first modified to exclude only those taxes which directly-burdened interstate commerce, or discriminated against
it. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161 (1889) ; i COOLEY, TAXATIOx ( 4 th ed. 1924) § 374. For
a discussion of the application of this rule, see Brown, loc. cit. supra note 4; Perkins, The
Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 99; Powell,
Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over State Taxation (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 773.
6. 222 U. S. 2Io (1911).
7. Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169 (935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 795,
1o WAsH. L. REV. 212. This case was an extension of the doctrine applied in Ware & Leland
v. Mobile, 209 U. S. 405 (19o8).
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to the contract that the goods be shipped in interstate commerce, a tax on the
sale was constitutional. This decision could conceivably have been extended to
support the instant tax, since there was nothing to prevent the Ohio company
from setting up a factory in New York to build the machines. However, in
declaring the tax unconstitutional, the court followed the existing law. s Never9
theless, the decision seems to violate the true spirit of the commerce clause.
This clause was included in the Constitution in order to prevent discrimination
against interstate commerce.' 0 But, as applied in the instant case, it results in
Because of the increasing imdiscrimination against intrastate commerce."
portance of sales taxes, 12 and the unfortunate position of intrastate merchants,
various suggestions have been made to avoid the application of the rule of the
instant case. Either the substitution of a "use" tax,'" or permission by Congress
to the states to tax interstate commerce,'14 or a tax by Congress, the proceeds to
be distributed to the states,' 5 would be desirable if the courts persist in refusing
to make the sole test of immunity one of discrimination.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Small Loan Act of State of Washington-Plaintiff, a small loan company, sought a declaratory judgment to
have the Washington Small Loan Act,' which had not yet gone into effect, declared unconstitutional. Held (two justices dissenting), that the Small Loan
Act was unconstitutional, because exemptions in the Act constituted a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution 2 and the privileges
and immunities clause of the State Constitution; $ also, that the Declaratory
Judgments Act 4 was properly invoked, even though the adjudication preceded
the effective date of the Small Loan Act. Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 73 P.
(2d) 341 (Wash. 1937).
The instant decision is squarely opposed to the overwhelming weight of
authority, which has upheld similar legislation as not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, despite the exemption of trust companies, national banks,
8. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 (1903) ; Musser v. Grosjean, 7 F. Supp.
(W. D. La. 1934). See articles cited supra note 4.
9. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
lo. Perkins, supra note 5, at 1O4.
ii. Id. at ioo; Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L. REV. 223.
iz. Twenty-eight states had adopted sales taxes by 1936. Perkins, supra note 5, at 99,
n. 2 (includes citations to state statutes). See Note (1936) 9 So. CALIF. L. REv. 154, n. 3.
13. Cf. Hennisford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937), I MD. L. REV. 263, upholding a tax on the use of goods that had been purchased exempt from sales taxes. This may
prove a lesson in draftsmanship whereby New York may accomplish what the instant case
1OO

prevents.

14. Lowndes, loc. cit. supra note ii.
15. Perkins, supra note 5, at 118.
i. Wash. Laws 25th Sess. 1937, c. 213, p. 1034. The Act, in effect, provided that any
person, partnership, association, or corporation, except a bank, trust company, building and
loan association, credit union, industrial loan company, or a retail merchant selling under
conditional sales contracts, who charges a greater rate of interest than 12% a year on loans
of $3o0. or less, shall be subject to criminal punishment and forfeit the loan. The Act is similar to the Uniform Small Loan Law, drafted by the Russel Sage Foundation in 1916, which
has been enacted with some variations in a majority of the states. See Note (1929) 42 HARv.
L. REv. 689; Legis. (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 581. Section 20 of the Uniform Small Loan Law
exempt banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, and pawnbrokers from the
provisions of the Act.
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § i.
3. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 12.
4. Washington Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wash. Laws 24th Sess. 1935, c.
113, p. 305.
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licensed pawnbrokers, building and loan associations, and other classes from
5
the statutory regulations. The constitutionality of these apparent discriminations among classes which might very well fit into the general category of
"lenders" is based on the fact that the legislature possesses a wide measure of
discretion in classifying the objects of its legislation; 6 and in view of the purposes of small loan legislation, the classifications have been considered reasonable and not arbitrary. 7 It is a matter of common knowledge that the imposition of oppressive interest rates on small loans is customarily practiced by a
certain class engaged in this business." Since the business is so well known, it
has been felt that the legislatures do not violate the equal protection clause in
treating the persons engaged in that business as a distinct class in the field of
financial operations. 9 Furthermore, it follows that, if the statute affects a distinct class, the exemptions do not grant any special privileges or immunities to
the excepted classes, since they are not members of this class. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that the instant court, in the face of such emphatic authority to
the contrary, chose to overlook the fundamental distinctions involved, in order
to achieve a result of no particular merit.
Since the statute was not in effect at the time of the adjudication, 0it might
be questioned whether the facts presented a "case"1 or "controversy" 1 within
the requirements of the Declaratory Judgments Act. 7 Although the Declaratory
Judgments Act has apparently never before been applied to determine the constitutionality of a statute not yet effective, it would seem, by analogy12 to other
A case
well-settled principles in this field, that the application was warranted.
is justiciable under the Act so long as the "ripening seeds" of a controversy
(which has been defined as a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable
not
litigation) are present.' 3 Certainly a statute already passed, even though
14
Thus,
yet effective, will inevitably affect the rights of the interested parties.
the instant court's liberal construction of the Declaratory Judgments Act seems
sound."'
Contracts-Gold Clause-Power of Federal Government to Call for
Redemption Bonds Containing Gold Clauses by Offer of Present Currency-Holders of Liberty Loan bonds payable in United States gold coin
5. E. g., People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. I59, ii8 N. E. 87 (917) ; Warner v. People, 71 Colo.
559, 208 Pac. 459 (1922) ; Badger v. State, 154 Ga. 443, 114 S.E. 635 (1922) ; Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129, 104 Atl. 505 (1918).
6. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 6I (1911) ; see Griffith v. Connecticut,
218 U. S.563, 569 (910).
7. See Koen v. State, 162 Tenn. 573, 579, 39 S. W. (2d) 283, 285 (931) ; State v. Sherman, 18 Wyo. i69, 177, 305 Pac. 299, 300 (1909).
8. See Commonwealth v. Puder, 261 Pa. 129, 136, 104 Atl. 505, 507 (1918); State v.
Sherman, 18 Wyo. i69, 181, io5 Pac. 299, 302 (1909).
9. See Ravitz v. Steurele, 257 Ky. 1O8, 119, 77 S. W. (2d) 360, 366 (1934); State v.
Hill, 168 La. 761, 773-774, 123 So. 317, 321 (1929).
31 COL. L. REv.
Io. See Borchard, Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments (193)
561, 6Io, for a general discussion of "case" or "controversy".
ii. Wash. Laws 24th Sess. 1935, c. 113, P.305.
- 12. "'While the courts properly refuse to declare rights based on the effect of remote contingencies which may never happen, they do not hesitate to declare rights based on events
certain to happen. . . " Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments in Pennsylvania (1934) 82 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 317, at 335.
13. In re Cryan's Estate, 3O Pa. 386, at 395, 152 Atl. 675, at 679 (1930).
14. This situation is obviously distinguishable from Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo.
198, 274 Pac. 743 (1929), where the court properly refused to test, by a declaratory judgment,
the validity of a proposed ordinance not yet enacted.
I5. Analogy can be drawn to a suit to restrain the enforcement of a statute which has not
yet gone into effect. Such a suit has been held not premature, and thus, a fortiori, presents a
justiciable controversy. Peirce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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of "the present standard of value" refused to present their bonds for redemption
when they were called in by the Treasury. They now claim interest allegedly
accruing since that date, contending that the offer to redeem in present currency
was not a compliance with the terms of the contract, and did not, therefore,
accelerate the due date of the bonds. Held (Justices Sutherland, Butler and
McReynolds dissenting), that the Treasury had performed the condition precedent for accelerating the maturity of the bonds.' Snyth v. United States; Dixie
Terminal Co. v. United States; United States v. Machen, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937)
5 U. S. L. WEEK 371.
The circuit court decision 2 of the Machen case was criticized in a previous
issue of the REVIEW as not being in consonance with Perry v. United States.4
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court has at least made the result of
the two cases logical. However, the decision was based on a different theory
from that advanced in the REVIEW. The Court regarded the notice for redemption in itself a literal compliance with the condition precedent to an acceleration
of the date on which the principal would have become due, without regard to
the legality of the payment which will be offered in fulfilment of the Government's obligation. Inasmuch as the manner in which the Government will pay
off the bonds is certain, the result of the instant case might have been obtained
by considering the notice for redemption in present-day currency a substantial
compliance with the condition precedent. This reasoning would logically follow
from the Perry case, which held that payment in present-day currency is a
transmission of the same quantum of purchasing power to the payee as payment
in gold value.

Evidence-Federal Communications Act-Admissibility in Evidence
of Conversation Obtained by Federal Agents by Wire Tappiig-The Federal Communications Act prohibits the interception and disclosure of any interstate communication by any "person" without authorization by either party.'
Federal agents "tapped" defendants' telephone wires, and the record of the conversations was introduced as evidence in a criminal trial. Held (Justices Sutherland and McReynolds dissenting), that the evidence is inadmissible, because the
word "person" in the Act comprehends federal agents engaged in the detection
of a crime. Nardone v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., (I937) 5 U. S. L. WEEKC
404.
It has long been accepted as a principle of statutory construction
that general terms of a statute do not include the government within their meaning
unless that construction is entirely clear.2 It has been stated that the reason
x. Justice Black concurred with the views of the majority opinion. Justice Stone con-

curred in result, but on the ground that these contracts are not different from private contracts, and are therefore susceptible to the exercise of the federal power over the value of
money, thus repudiating the Perry decision.
2. 87 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 4th, i937). The lower court decisions of the other two
cases, united in this appeal, arrived at a result opposite to that of the Machen case, and therefore were affirmed. Smyth v. United States, U. S. Ct. Cl., May 3, 1937; Dixie Terminal Co.
v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 656 (1936).
3. (i937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 846.
4. 294 U. S. 330 (I935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 686. For an able critical discussion of the
gold clause decisions, see Dickinson, The Gold Decisions (935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 715.
I. 48 STAT. I064 (934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1936).
2. See Savings Bank v. United States, ig Wall. 227, 239 (U. S. 1873); BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF TEE LAW (2d ed. 19i) § 36; CRAi~s, TREATIsE ON STATUTE LAW ( 4 th ed. of
HARDcASTLE ON STATUTORY LAW, I9O6) 351.
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for this rule, as well as a limitation upon it, is the absolute, inherent right of
3
control of the sovereign over its prerogatives, interests and titles. Other authorities, however, have not so limited the rule, declaring that the reason for the
principle is simply that the legislature applies different reasoning to individuals

than to governments, 4 and, similarly, that general statutes are directed solely
towards rights of individuals.5 It has also been stated as the basis of this rule
of construction that there is a presumption against any legislative intention to
surrender public rights or affect the government. 6 From the vague and equivocal
concepts of these authorities, it would seem that the Court would have been

equally justified had it reached the conclusion of the minority, that the government's sovereign police power and interest in apprehending criminals was so

affected as to indicate that there was no intention to include the Federal Government in the statute.7 Certainly, the application of these indefinite rules of
interpretation has not lead to a uniform result, for the word "person" has been
9
held to exclude the United States 8 as well as to include it. Therefore, it appears
by the Court in
considered
been
must
have
tapping
of
wire
merits
that the
reaching its decision, and that its views on the constitutional and moral consid0
erations have changed since the Olnzstead case,' which upheld the constitution-

ality of wire tapping, and sustained, on common law principles, the admission
of evidence so procured.'1

Negligence-Duty of Inspection by Carrier to Employee of Consignee
Unloading Car Where Consignor and Consignee Are Same CorporationDefendant, a common carrier, contracted to haul a tank car of sulphuric acid
from the by-products plant to the polishing mill of X Corporation. The car,
leased by the X Corporation from the M Chemical Company, was equipped, at
the time, with a dangerously defective air cap. Defendant transported it to its
own siding adjoining the mill. While plaintiff, a mill employee of the corporation, was attempting to unload the car, the cap blew off and he was severely
burned by the escaping acid. Held, that the defendant was not liable, because,
3. See Savings Bank v. United States, ig Wall. 227, 239 (U. S. 1873) ; BLACK, Op. Cit.
2, at § 36; MAXWEL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (7th ed. 1929) 117.
4. See United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15373, at 330 (C. C. Mass. 1821) ; Balthasar v. Pacific Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 3o6, 202 Pac. 37, 38 (1921).
5. CAMEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 351; ENDLIcH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1888)
§§ 161, 167.
6. See In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 648, 651 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
7. The disclosure prohibited in a similar statute was held not to refer to testimony in a
legal proceeding. Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 274 (Pa. C. C. 185).
8. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1876) ; Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Guarantee
Title & Trust Co., 174 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o9) ; Davis v. Pringle, i F. (2d) 86o (C. C.
A. 4th, 1924) ; United States v. Securities Corp. General, 4 F. (2d) 61g (App. D. C. 1925) ;
Matter of Will of Fox, 52 N. Y. 530 (1873). See also Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass.
398, 403-404 (93I).
9. In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922).
io. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). Justices Sutherland and McReynolds concurred with the majority in the Olnstead case, while Justices Brandeis, Butler and
Stone wrote dissenting opinions. The other Justices were not members of the Court in 1928.
Consequently there was no change of opinion on the general subject of wire tapping, so far as
the Justices who sat on both cases are concerned.
It is suggested that the Ohnstead case might be overruled if the question came up today
on an intrastate message, not covered by statute. See comment on United States v. Weiss,
Dist. Ct. N. Y., in N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1938, p. 13, col. 3.
ii. The instant decision will probably not hinder law officers to a great extent if evidence uncovered by means of inadmissible conversations is admitted. Such evidence should
be admitted by analogy to the admission of facts discovered on the basis of an inadmissible
confession. See 2 WaEmoR, EVIDENrCE § 859 (1923).

supra note
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in view of the identity of consignor and consignee, no duty to inspect for such
defects was owed the consignee or its employees.1 Dominices v. Monongahela
Connecting Ry., 195 At. 747 (Pa. 1937).
The common carrier has long been the subject of numerous affirmative
obligations. 2 Among these, it is well settled that ordinarily the carrier owes the
consignee and his servants, a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection
of cars prior to delivery, in order either to remedy a defect constituting a probable source of danger, or to give proper notice thereof.3 And since the carrier
is regarded as the supplier of the chattel 4 and the one upon whom both the consignee and his employees rely for its safe condition, it is immaterial that the
ownership of the car is in another. 5 Inasmuch as the carrier has a business
interest in the unloading of the car, 6 the reason for imposing the duty seems
clear. However, a novel problem is presented in the instant case where both
consignor and consignee were but separate departments of the same corporation.
This legal identity was regarded by the court as the controlling fact negativing
the existence of the usual duty, in that the consignee was now regarded as the
true supplier of the chattel with presumed notice of its defective condition. This
view would seem to constitute a strained legalism, in light of the separate management of the two plants, with a common tie only through a unity of ownership.
Although the X Corporation would be precluded from recovery because of its
own negligence, to regard this "identity" as of sufficient import to divest the carrier of its usual obligation to the employee, and to deprive the latter of his right
to rely on the carrier for the safe condition of the car, appears unreasonably to
extend the incidents attaching to common ownership. Since the duty of inspection is already owed its own employees, 7 no additional burden would be imposed
upon the carrier by a contrary adjudication in the instant case.
Restraint of Trade-Secondary Boycott by Motion Picture Exhibitors
Against Producer-Plaintiff, a motion picture producer, sought to enjoin
i. The court also declared that even if it were conceded that defendant was negligent,
the intervening act of the consignee in ordering plaintiff to unload the car when it was presumably cognizant of its dangerous condition, constituted such unforeseeable negligence as to
break the chain of proximate causation. While an analysis of this phase of the opinion is not
within the scope of the present discussion, the conclusion reached by the court appears unwarranted. Cf. Teasdale v. Beacon Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N. E. 612 (1929). For an excellent discussion of the principles governing this aspect of the decision, see Eldredge, Culpable
Intervention as Superseding Cause (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 121.
2. See Bohlen, The Basis of Affirnative Obligationsin the Law of Tort (1905) 53 Am.
L. REG. (N. s. 44) 209.

3. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Sellers, 188 Ark. 218, 65 S. W. (2d) 14 (1933); Markley v.
Kansas City So. Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 9o S. W. (2d) 409 (1936) ; Michelson v. Erie R. R., io6
N. J. L. 147, 147 Atl. 535 (1929) ; McGinley v. Central R. R. of N. J., 235 Pa. 576, 84 Atl.
579 (1912). Contra: Risque's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., lO4 Va. 476, 51 S. E. 730
(I905). Where more than one carrier is involved in the transit, these responsibilities have
been imposed on both the initial and delivering carriers. Roy v. Georgia R. & B. Co., 17 Ga.
APP. 34, 86 S. E. 328 (1915) ; Doering v. St. Louis & 0. Ry., 63 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo. App.
1933). The intermediate carrier, however, has been exempt from any obligation other than
to its succeeding carrier. Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 178 Mo. 693, 77 S. W. 723 (1903).
4. Ladd v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 193 Mass. 359, 79 N. E. 74z (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 392, comment a.
5. Ladd v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 193 Mass. 359, 79 N. E. 742 (1907) ; Rick v.
New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 232 Pa. 553, 81 At. 65o (1911); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934)

§ 392, comment c.
6. Parker v. Grand Trunk Western R. R., 261 Mich. 293, 246 N. W. 125 (1933) ; RFSTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 392, comment d.
7. This is based, however, on its common law responsibility to furnish its employees with
a reasonably safe place of employment. L. C. Burr & Co. v. Greenlee, lO2 S. W. (2d) 77
(Ark. 1937) ; Elkins v. Pennsylvania R. R., 171 Pa. 121, 33 Atl. 74 (1895).
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the defendant organization of independent motion picture theatre owners from
enforcing a boycott against the exhibition of the plaintiff's films.' The defendant
organization had distributed circulars to other theatre owners, threatening that
any theatre negotiating with the plaintiff in violation of the "strike" would be
picketed, and had planned a varied program of appeal to the public not to
patronize such theatres. Subsequently, the defendant organization withdrew its
original plan to station pickets in front of non-cooperating theatres, although the
exhibitors affected were not notified of the change. The lower court thereupon
dismissed the bill for lack of jurisdiction. Held, that the proposed boycott was
an illegal restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,and therefore enjoinable under the Clayton Act.3 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v.
United Motion Picture Theatre Owners of E. Pa., So. N. J.& Del., Inc., C. C.

A. 3d, (1937) 5 U. S. L. WEEK

424.4

The lower court in the instant case 5 felt that the mere agreement of members of an organization not to deal with a producer, coupled with an attempt by
peaceful means to persuade others similarly to refrain, is not a direct restraint
of interstate commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act, so long as the
effect of the combination is not directly to halt shipment of goods in interstate
commerce,8 but rather to prevent the execution of contracts in accordance with
which such shipments would normally be made. It has previously been held,
however, that a restraint on interstate commerce is a necessary corollary of a
restraint on contracts of this nature.7 While a mere agreement not to trade is
not an illegal combination if its effect on interstate commerce is remote,8 actual
restraint will not be excused on the ground that the purpose of the combination
was to combat unfair trade practices detrimental to the members.9 Furthermore,
the intended action of the defendant organization involved a secondary boycott
forbidden by the Act, since peaceful persuasion of third parties is no more lawful
than active coercion.10 Thus, the instant decision presents the logical view,
supported by existing law in the field.
Taxation-Recovery of Overpayments of Income Tax Although Exceeded by Unpaid Taxes for Earlier Year beyond Statutory Period for Collection-Petitioner sued to recover overpayments of income tax made in
i. The boycott did not involve a labor dispute, but was an effort to force Paramount to
offer better terms in its 1937-1938 license agreements with the exhibitors.
2. 26 STAT. 209 (89), x5 U. S. C. A. § 1 (927).
3. 38 STAT. 737 (915), 15 U. S.C.A. § 26 (927).
4.Cf. United States v.Interstate Circuit, 2o Fed. Supp. 868 (N.D. Tex.1937).
5.Paramount Pictures, Inc. v.United Motion Picture Theatre Owners of E. Pa., So.
N.J. & Del., Inc., U. S.Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa., Sept. 8,1937.
6. The District Court emphasized the fact that the recent case of Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), involved a forcible stoppage of shipment.
7. Binderup v. Path6 Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 (1923).

8. Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604 (1898); Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U. S.231 (igi8) ; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S.344
(933).
9.Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912) ; Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo (94) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S.37 (927) ; Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U. S.553 (1936).
io. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S.274 (igo8) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo (1914); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (9x5) ; Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443 (1921). The instant court, however, held that
the withdrawal of the threat to picket non-cooperative theatres was of no effect in destroying
the coercive character of the boycott, since no notice of the withdrawal was given to the affected parties, thus repudiating the importance given to this feature of the case by the lower
court.
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1929, 193o, and 1931 on sums received in those years, by the estate of which
petitioner was administrator, under an installment sale made by the decedent in
1924.1 Decedent died in 1928, and by statute 2 the tax on the installments to be
paid in subsequent years became due from the decedent in 1928. The unpaid
tax for 1928 exceeded the amount of the overpayments made in 1929, i93O, and
1931.' Held, that the petitioner should recover the overpayments, because
under § 6o7 and § 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 4 the overpayments could not
be credited toward the 1928 tax, collection of which was barred by the statute
of limitations.5 McEachern v.Rose, 58 Sup. Ct. 84 (1937).
Although the conclusion of the Court follows logically from the interpretation of the statute,6 it is difficult to rationalize its present position with other
recent decisions. In Stone v. White,7 the petitioners, testamentary trustees,
paid an assessed deficiency in income tax 8 before the statute of limitations had
run as to the beneficiary. After the statute had run, the Supreme Court held
that the income was taxable solely to the beneficiary. 9 The trustees were not
permitted to recover the tax paid, on the ground that they had no equitable basis
for recovery, since any refund would inure to the benefit of the beneficiary, who
should rightfully have paid the tax. Thus, the Government's equitable defense
was permitted to override the explicit provisions of the statute. 10 The only
legal ground for the Government's retaining the tax would appear to be that
the sum should be credited to the tax due. Yet the statute had run against the
beneficiary, and § 60911 clearly indicates that such a credit would be void, because a payment by the beneficiary at the time of the attempted credit would be
an overpayment under § 607.12 It seems probable, in view of a statement in the
I. Under 45 STAT. 805 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 44 (a) (934), a person selling personal
property on the installment plan may choose to return as income for any taxable year that
proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit
to be realized when payment is completed bears to the total contract price.
2. 45 STAT. 8o6 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §44 (d) and note (1934). The construction of
the statute is made clear in Nuckolls v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935);
Lawler v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
3. The Circuit Court had reversed the judgment for the petitioner in the District Court,
on the ground that the petitioner was not, in equity and good conscience, entitled to recover
the overpayments which, because of the failure to pay the 1928 tax, had resulted in no unjust
enrichment to the Government. Rose v. McEachern, 86 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
4. Section 607, 45 STAT. 874 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 167o (a) (2) (934) : "Any tax
. assessed or paid after the expiration of the period of limitation properly applicable
thereto shall be considered an overpayment and shall be credited or refunded to the taxpayer. ...
Section 6o9, 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1675 (a) (934) : "Any credit against
a liability in respect of any taxable year shall be void if any payment in respect of such liability would be considered an overpayment under § 607."
The instant Court points out that § 6o9 prevents crediting to the 1928 tax not only the
I93o and 1931 overpayments, made after collection of the 1928 tax was barred, but also the
1929 payment, inasmuch as there could be no crediting till after the amount of the overpayment was ascertained and allowed, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 976 (Ct.
Cl. 1934) ;and by that time the 1928 tax was barred.
5. 45 STAT.856 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §275 and note (1934).
6. United States v. John Gallagher Co., 83 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; 5 PAUL
AND MFRTENS,

LAW

OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1935)

§ 51.34.

7. 301 U. S. 532 (1937). Cf. Roebling v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 644 (1933).
8. Circuit court decisions had held that the tax was not properly assessed to the beneficiary. Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
9. Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365 0933).
io. There is no indication of any estoppel such as has been held to prevent application by
the courts of § 6og. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54 (i934) ; Zatn Co. v. United
States, 6 F. Supp. 317 (Ct Cl. 1934).
II.45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1675 (a) (934).
12. 45 STAT. 874 (1928) 26 U. S. C. A. § I67O (a) (2) (1934).
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instant case,13 that the Court intends to distinguish between cases of overpayments purportedly creditable to barred deficiencies for the same period, when,
as in the Stone case, equitable principles will be applied, and overpayments purportedly creditable to barred deficiencies for other periods,14 when the statute
will be strictly applied. Whether such treatment is justifiable under a literal
reading of the statute is very questionable. In the instant case, the Court
might have held, as readily as in the Stone case, that the Government could, on
equitable principles, retain the overpayments, without invoking the consequences
of § 609 by attempting to credit the overpayments to the barred deficiency.15
Furthermore, this case indicates a change in the Court's attitude toward a
dictum in Bull v. United States,'6 cited in support of the Government's equitable
defense in the Stone case,' 7 that ". . . recoupment is in the nature of a defense
arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is
grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so long
as the main action itself is timely." 's The analogy introduced in the Stone case
appears equally applicable in the instant case,' yet the Court refused to apply it,
and held that the defense was barred by the statute. It can only be hoped that
further decisions will succeed in dispersing the haze which the ambiguity and
conflict of these cases have thrown upon the interpretation of these Sections of
the Act.
Taxation-Stock Dividend of Preferred Shares to Common Shareholders as Taxable Income-In 1929, a corporation, having both preferred and
common stock outstanding, declared a preferred stock dividend to holders of
common shares. In the same year, the corporation redeemed at par value the
shares which the plaintiff had so received. Not having returned the dividend
as income, the plaintiff computed his tax on the redemption sum, according to
the Regulations then in force, by allocating the cost basis between his old shares
and the new.' The Commissioner levied an additional assessment based on the
full par value of the dividend shares. Held, that the dividend, although not
taxed by the 1928 Act,2 was income under the Sixteenth Amendment, and that,
therefore, the shares had a cost basis of zero for purposes of ascertaining the
taxable gain upon their redemption.3 Helvering v. Gowran, 58 Sup. Ct. 154
(1937).4
13. Instant case at 87:". • • congressional purpose by the enactment of sections 6o7 and
6o9 to require refund to the taxpayer of an overpayment, even though he has failed to pay
taxes for other periods, whenever that collection is barred by limitation."
14. See Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation
(1935)

48 HAxv. L.

REv. 1281, 1324.

15. See the discussion of factual distinctions between the cases, in 5 PAUL AND MERTENS,
LAw OF FEDERAL I NcoE TAXATI N (Supp. 1937) § 53.17.
16. 295 U. S. 247 (1935).
17. 301 U. S. 532, 539 (1937).
18. 295 U. S. 247, 262 (1935).
i9. The Government's defense that the money was due for the i928 tax arose out of the
same transaction as that which led to the petitioner's suit.
i. U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 58, 6oo.
2. 45 STAT. 822 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (f)

(935).

3. 45 STAT. 815, 818 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ III (a), 113 (a) (1935).
4. At the same time, the Court decided Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 58 Sup. Ct. 159 (1937),
finding a similar stock dividend taxable under the 1928 Act, but refusing to allow the Commissioner to'attack an adverse ruling in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 88 F. (2d) 3 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1937), on the question of the taxation of money received on conversion of the stock,
since he had not appealed on that point from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 34
B. T. A. 1313 (1935).
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This decision settled some of the speculation that was raised by Koshland
v. Helvering, which held that a dividend of common shares on preferred was
not within the constitutional prohibition against taxation of stock dividends
enunciated in Eisner v. Macomber," since the recipient acquired a different proportional interest in the corporate assets.7 Deciding, logically enough, that the
same reasoning applied to a dividend of preferred shares on common,8 the Court
found that nevertheless the 1928 Act"9 (one of a series of Revenue Acts passed
after the Eisner case and providing that "stock dividends shall not be subject
to tax") "0 in its terms exempted from taxation all dividends in stock of the
declaring corporation." This exemption, however, was held to refer only to
the receipt of the dividend, and conferred no immunity upon the proceeds of the
stock when converted.' 2 This latter amount is taxable under the "gain or loss"
provisions of the Act, which plainly say that the "excess of the amount realized"
over "cost" is to be taxed.' 3 The shares, having been received as income, cost
the plaintiff nothing, and therefore had a basis of zero. 14 It might be contended
that, while clearly within the provisions of the Act, the redemption sum did not
constitute taxable income, since the stock redeemed had already once represented income.' 5 But it is settled that Congress may postpone, within reasonable
limits, the taxation of income,:' and, in view of the obvious fact that Congress
5. 289 U. S. 441 (1936), commented upon in Legis. (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 83, ioo
et seq.; (1937) 35 Mica. L. Rxv. 692. Accord: Commissioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F.
(2d) 189 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
6. 252 U. S. i89 (192o), 68 U.

OF PA. L. R.v. 394.
7. The holding of the Eisner case had already been considerably limited by a series of
cases involving reorganization, from which it appeared that a mere formal change in the
nature of a shareholder's holding might amount to the realization of taxable income. See
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 317, and cases cited id. at 317, n. 9; MAGIL., TAXABLE INcOME
(1936) 52-68.
8. This result had already been assumed by the Treasury Department. U. S. Treas. Reg.
94, Art. 115-7, Example (3). Accord: James H. Torrens, 31 B. T. .A_787 (1934).
9. 45 STAT. 822 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (f) (I935).
io. 42 STAT. 228 (1921); 43 STAT. 255 (1924); 44 STAT. 11 (1926); 47 STAT. 204
This provision has been
(1932) ; 48 STAT. 712 (I934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (f) (1935).
omitted from the 1936 Act. 49 STAT. 1688, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (f) (x) (Supp. 1936).
ii.The Court might have held that, since Congress had exempted stock dividends in the
erroneous belief that such dividends could not constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment, it did not mean to exempt taxable stock dividends in enacting this
Section. The 1936 Revenue Act shows that now, at least, Congress intends to tax all taxable
stock dividends. 49 STAT. 1688, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 () (i) (Supp. 1936).
12. The lower court had applied the analogy of tax-free gifts and bequests, which, in absence of statute, are taxed on a cost basis of value at time of receipt. Gowran v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), rehearing denied, 87 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937). This analogy was rejected by the Supreme Court, since there is no specific provision
in the Act for taxable stock dividends, as there is for gifts and bequests. 45 STAT. 819 (1928),
26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (a) (4), (5) (934).
13. 45 STAT. 815, 818 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ In (a), 113 (a) (1935).
14. See (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 113, 115.
I5. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 147: ". - . income after its receipt does become
capital. . ....
16. Thus, provisions of the Revenue Act, by which the gain realized on certain tax-free
exchanges is not taxed until later conversion of the property received on exchange, have been
upheld by the courts. Newman, Saunders & Co. v. United States, 36 F. (2d) IOO9 (Ct. Cl.
1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 760 (1930) ; Perthur Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 6i F.
These provisions in the present
(2d) 785 (C. C. A. 1932), cert. denied,288 U. S. 616 (i933).
Act, 49 STAT. 1682, 26 U. S. C. A. § 113 (a) (6)-(8) (Supp. 1936), have appeared in substantially the same form in every Revenue Act since 1924. Cf. (937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv.
744.
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here intended not to create an entire exemption,' 7 but merely to avoid unconstitutional taxation, the tax upon redemption was properly upheld. 8
As a corollary to this case, it would seem to follow that a preferred dividend upon preferred shares would constitute a taxable dividend, because it also
involves a change in proportional interest. 9 But in the case of a preferred dividend with only common shares previously outstanding, 20 which would involve no
such proportionate change, even though new rights might be acquired, 2 ' it is

still questionable what the Court will hold, since the instant opinion apparently
attached no significance to the fact that there had been both common and preferred shares outstanding. 22 Had the Court chosen to state this fact as a necessary ground for its decision, it might have given some indication as to what will
be the final solution of another vexing problem 23 of stock dividend taxation.

Taxation-Taxability as Income of Payments Received by Kin on
Their Promise Not to Contest Will-Testatrix bequeathed her residuary
estate in trust for charity, and those who would have inherited under intestate
laws objected to probate of the will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity. A
compromise, whereby the residue of the estate was divided, one-half to the
charities and one-half to the heirs, was approved by the probate court. Plaintiff,
one of the heirs, sued to recover income tax paid by him on property thus received. Held, that the plaintiff" did not receive taxable income, because the
property was not gain derived from capital or labor. Lyeth v. Hoey, 2o F.
Supp. 619 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
In reaching its result, the court refused to follow a decision of the Board
of Tax Appeals,' which held that there was taxable income in a similar situation.
By placing its decision squarely on the proposition that there was here no income
under the traditional definition of Eisner v. Macomber,2 the court avoided the
i7. See Miun
(1931) 246-247.

,
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AND

OTHER EXCHANGES

IN INCOME TAXATION

I8. Under the Koshland decision, the basis of the shareholder's original stock 'could not
be reduced by partial allocation to the new shares. If, then, the new stock were held to acquire a basis of market value at the time received, we should have the anomalous situation of
taxable dividends receiving a more complete immunity from taxation than non-taxable dividends under the Eisner case. This could not have been the intention of Congress.
ig. See MAGML, op. cit. supra note 7, at 48; Legis. (936) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv. 83, Io4.
20. In August Horrman, 34 B. T. A. 1178 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 429 (937), decided after the Koshland case, such a dividend was held not to be taxable income. Accord:
Brown v. Commissioner, 69 F. (2d) 602 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
21.. The newly-acquired power to dispose of part of one's holdings and yet to retain certain preferences over the shares disposed of might be held to constitute income. Compare
cases cited supranote 7. See MAGIIL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 47, n. 74.
22. "This preferred stock had substantially the same attributes as that involved in the
Koshland case." Instant case at 326.
23. Note the equivocal language of the Regulation applicable to this situation. U. S.
Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 15-7.

i. Bernard 0. Kearney, 31 B. T. A. 935 (1934), 44 YALE L. J. 1267 (935).
Certain
distinctions might be drawn between this and the instant case, but query if they are substantial ones. In the first place, in the Kearney case, the money received by the taxpayer was
paid by legatees out of their own funds prior to the receipt of legacies under the will, while in
the instant case the funds came directly from the executor of the estate. Secondly, in the
Kearney case, all parties agreed that the will should be adjudged valid, and the estate administered according to its terms, while in the present case, the probate court directed that the
executors administer the estate in accordance with the agreement of compromise. Thirdly, it
might be argued that the taxpayer's claim as heir is somewhat more substantial in the instant
case. Cf. Elizabeth H. Sterling, 34 B. T. A. 1124 (1936).
2. 252 U. S. x8, at 2o7 (1920) : "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capi-

tal, from labor, or from both combined ..

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

problem of what the amount of the tax would be if there were income,3 and did
not have to consider whether the payment to the plaintiff was exempt either as
a gift or as an inheritance. 4 If the plaintiff did not receive income, what was
the nature of the payment to him? 5 It cannot be considered as a gift, since
foregoing his right to contest the will constituted valid consideration for the
payment to him. On the other hand, the conclusion that the payment constituted an inheritance is open to the objection that the plaintiff in fact did not take
under the intestate laws. Yet the court might reasonably have refused to decide
whether the payment was income or not, and have held that, since the plaintiff
had a substantial claim under the inheritance laws, a payment in bona fide settlement of that claim should be treated as though obtained through descent, and
should therefore be exempt. Though courts are reluctant to hold that a payment is exempt from taxation as a gift or an inheritance, 6 such a line of reasoning would lead to the same result that the court reaches, and would make it
unnecessary for the court to apply a restrictive definition of income that has
been modified 7 and even, at times, ignored s by the Supreme Court. However,
the result of the decision is proper, in that it falls within the spirit of the policy
of the income tax law exempting property passing by bequest or descent." To
subject the plaintiff to an income tax would be to encourage prolonged litigation
in other similar cases, for if the plaintiff were to press his suit to contest the will
and win, he would pay no income tax.

Unfair Competition-Use of Similar Name as Unfair Competition
without Actual Competition Between the Parties-Plaintiff, a food retailer,
sought to enjoin a radio retailer from using the plaintiff's nationally known
trade name, "A. & P.", in its corporate name and business. Held, that the
attempted appropriation of the value of the plaintiff's trade name constituted
unfair competition, even though the parties were not competitors. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 703 (E. D.
Pa. 1937).
3. If it be assumed that the plaintiff received payment from the legatees through an exchange of property, i. e., by reason of the relinquishment of his right to contest the will, there
is still considerable ground for the contention that the taxation of the whole amount of the
payment, as was permitted in the Kearney case, is improper, in view of the fact that the right
relinquished was of substantial value-if not indeed equivalent to the money received.
4. 48 STAT. 686, 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (3) (I934).
5. The court states that, under the law of Massachusetts, the heirs took "by purchase",
but that the local law is not controlling in the determination of the character of property for
income tax purposes. Instant case at 621. Though this is a debatable point, the view of the
court is desirable in the interest of uniform administration of the federal income tax. For
discussions of the extent to which local property rules are applicable in cases involving federal income taxation, see Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932) ; Freuler v. Helvering, 291
U. S. 35 (934)

; Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (937)

; Roebling v. Commissioner, 78

F. (2d) 444 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (934)
§ 53.38.
6. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. i6I (925); Mary G. Mulqueen, 25 B. T. A. 44i (1932),
aff'd, 65 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
7. See (937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 317, and note 9.
8. Justice Holmes refused to apply the narrow definition of income, as stated in the Eisner case, in both Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. I6I (925), and United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 284 U. S. I (931), stating in the latter case, at 3: "We see nothing to be gained by the
discussion of judicial definitions. The defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken
here." Cf. Acme Land & Fur Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F. (2d) 44i (C. C. A. 5th, 1936),
aff'9 3i B. T. A. 582 (1934).

9. Query, what effect the decision in the instant case will have on other cases of compromise not involving wills. Cf. S. A. Pierce, 8 B. T. A. 1219 (1927).
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Although, generically, the term "unfair competition" presupposes competition of some kind,1 the modem tendency of the courts to emphasize the word
"unfair", rather than "competition", 2 renders understandable the pronouncement
of the instant court and others, in several recent cases, 3 that the doctrine may be
invoked even in the absence of actual competition. This seems to be the rule
not only in trade-mark 4 and trade name cases,5 where the question of lack of
competition arises quite frequently, 6 but also in other situations involving unfair
competition. 7 In the trade-mark and trade name cases, the granting of injunctive relief is usually conditioned upon the showing of a likelihood that the
public will be confused as to the identity of the maker of the defendant's product.8
There is some authority, however, to the effect that "confusion in a wider
sense"--some connection of the plaintiff with the defendant existing in the
public mind-is a sufficient basis for relief. Various theories have been advanced for granting relief, once likelihood of confusion is ascertained. Thus, it
has been said that the defendant should be enjoined from using the plaintiff's
mark or name in order that the public might be protected from deception; 1o in
order that the defendant might not be allowed to gain the advantage of the plaintiff's reputation or to appropriate the latter's goodwill; I or, in order that the
i.See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, 514 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1912).
2. See Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 53, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176, 178 (Sup.
Ct. 1937); Oates, Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Competitors
(1931) 25 Iu.. L. REV. 643, 645.
3. E.g., Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176
(Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Rector v. Rector's Tavern, Inc., 163 Misc. 213, 299 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
4. As to the distinction between trade-marks and trade names, see Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 182; Handler and Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade
Names-An Analysis and Synthesis (ig3o) 30 COL. L. REv. 168, 759. However, the law of
trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition, and protection is afforded
in either case upon the same fundamental principles. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S.403, 413 (1916) ; cf. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc.
52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (trade-mark involved; court discusses unfair competition).
5.Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) (drugs and
cigars) ; Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 3oo Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (fashion
magazines and hats); Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925)
(automobiles and radio tubes); L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934) (fountain pens and razor blades) ; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt
Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. N. Y. 1929) (pipes and shirts); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 8or,
260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (ist Dep't, 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933) (jewelry
and motion pictures). Contra: Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 2O0
Fed. 51o (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) (ice cream and milk).
6. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv.
813, 825; Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law (1937) 37 Coi. L. REv. 582.
7. See Nims, UxrAm CouPLTrrox AND TRAD-MAmxs (3d ed. 1929) §§ I, 374; (937)
86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 217, 219, commenting upon Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station,
Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (Pa. 1937).
8. See Wolff, supra note 6, at 593, 594, and cases collected therein.
9.Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 5o9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Eastman
Photographic Materials Co. v. Griffith Cycle Corp., I5Rep. Pat. Cas. 105 (Ch. D. i898);
see Wolff, mtpra note 6, at 6oo, 6O.
io.See Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliott, 7 F. (2d) 962, 965 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1925). But
see Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 234 Fed. 804, 8o6 (E. D. N. Y. 1916), rev'd on
other grounds, 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
ii. This was stressed in the instant case at 705. See also Kotabs, Inc. v. Kotex Co., 50
F. (2d) 8io, 813 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931). But see Wolff, supra note 6, at 593, n. 53.
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normal potential expansion of the plaintiff's business might not be forestalled.12
Another greatly favored argument is the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff's
reputation. 18 It is suggested, however, that the real injury in these cases is
the gradual whittling away of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the
plaintiff's mark or name, and the resultant dilution of its selling powers, by
constant use in connection with non-competing goods. The degree of protection
afforded a mark or name against such dispersion of its identity should vary
directly with its uniqueness and its impress upon the public consciousness. 4
Such a rationalization, in entirely eliminating the issue of confusion, which has
proved troublesome, 15 is in consonance with the modern view that deception is
no longer the sine qua non of "unfair competition".' 8
12. Rector v. Rector's Tavern, Inc., 163 Misc. 213, 299 N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. ig37);
see Florence Mfg. Co. v. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73, 75 (C. C. A. 2d, i9io).
13. Instant case at 704, 705; Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52,
296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Rector v. Rector's Tavern, Inc., 163 Misc. 213, 299
N. Y. Supp. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See Wolff, supra note 6, at 593.
14. This rationale, in substance, was first presented in the United States in Schechter,
loc. cit. supra note 6, and received its first judicial recognition in this country in Tiffany &
Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), cited
supra note 5. Cf. The Odol case, Landgericht Elberfeld, Sept. I1, 1925, MW 25, 264 (for a
translation of the court's conclusion, see Schechter, supra note 6, at 832). See Schechter,
Fog and Fictionin Trade-mark Protection (1936) 36 CoL. L. R v. 6o, 65. The court in Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N. Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct. 1937), is
one of the very few courts to follow the example of the Tiffany case in endorsing this view;
but it did not make it the sole ground for its decision. Cf. Wolff, supra note 6, at 602.
15. See, e. g., the far-fetched reasoning employed in Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4
F. (2d) 333, 334 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), in order to establish the probability of confusion as to
source. The court reasoned that the public would be led to believe that defendant's radio
tubes were made by the plaintiff automobile company because the products of both parties
involved the use of electricity. See also Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair
Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rev. 197.
16. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918);
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 452, 194 Atl. 631, 640 (1937), 86
U. oF PA. L. REv. 217; Fathchild, Static and Dynamic Concepts of the Law of Unfair Competition (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 299; Rogers, Unfair Competition (i919) 17 MIcH. L. REv.
490.

